In this article, I revisit a widely used measure of legislative professionalism that I developed over a decade ago (Squire 1992a) . I argue that professionalism has different implications for legislators than for legislatures and that the concept is distinct from careerism. I then discuss the mechanics of compiling the measure, its reliability and validity, and potential criticism of the measure. Finally, I provide scores on the measure for 1979, 1986, 1996, and 2003, as well as scores for 1979 and 2003 for a revised measure that is theoretically appropriate for use in dynamic analyses.
. In this article, I revisit a widely used measure of legislative professionalism that I developed 15 years ago (Squire 1992a) . I discuss how I conceived of the measure and the theoretical concept of legislative professionalism. I then explain the mechanics of the index and assess its reliability and validity, in part by examining scores for 1979, 1986, 1996, and 2003 . Next, I consider a potential criticism of my measure and, in response, provide revised scores for 1979 and 2003 that allow for its use in dynamic studies. I conclude with a few final thoughts on the measure.
developing a measure of professionalism
The Grumm (1971) and Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (1971) measures were based on what each identified as ideal characteristics of a professionalized body. They both offered a definition of legislative professionalism and then proceeded to measure it. I approached measuring professionalism differently; rather than starting with a definition, I began with an example. My starting point was an observation that Nelson Polsby had made about the legislative professionalization movement:
One favored place to begin has been for reformers quite consciously to adopt as their model the United States Congress. In American state legislatures this has meant a movement toward the establishment of a respectable pay scale, provision for independent staff services, and increases in the time allowed for legislatures to sit. (Polsby 1975, 297) This comment suggested establishing Congress as the archetypical professional legislature. Accordingly, I devised a professionalism measure using relevant attributes of Congress as a baseline against which to compare those same attributes of other legislative bodies (Squire 1992a) . Specifically, I compared an index of Congress's pay to members, average days in session, and average staff per member to an index composed of those same attributes in other legislatures. In essence, the measure showed how closely a legislature approximated these characteristics of Congress on a scale where 1.0 represented perfect resemblance and 0.0 represented no resemblance. Almost every other professionalism measure has also incorporated data on member salary, time demands, and staff resources (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000, 694; Thompson and Moncrief 1992, 199) ; the use of Congress as a baseline against which to compare the state legislatures was the novel element of my index.
conceptualizing legislative professionalism
Ironically, while there has been general consensus about how to measure legislative professionalism, there has not been complete consensus about the underlying concept. Most notably, Rosenthal (1996, 175) argues that "professionalism as a concept ought to be restricted to the legislature, and not extended to include the members who comprise it." Rosenthal thinks that most measures and conceptualizing on this subject conflate an institutional concept and an individual-level concept. He argues that time demands and staffing levels are characteristics of the legislature as an institution and that member salary represents a characteristic-careerism-of legislators as individuals. Rosenthal sees these concepts as related, but distinct. Viewed in these terms, the accepted three-component measure of legislative professionalism creates somewhat different implications for legislators and legislatures. I suggest some of these implications in Table 1 .
The implications of professionalism for legislators demonstrate that the concept is only partly related to careerism. Certainly, as salaries increase, legislators have greater incentive to continue service in the legislature, a relationship at the heart of careerism. But increasing pay has an additional, more subtle, consequence for legislators in that it allows them to focus their energies exclusively on their legislative activities rather than having to juggle them with the demands of their regular occupations. Importantly, this second implication holds whether a member seeks a career in a legislature or intends to serve only for a brief period. Furthermore, the implications of time demands for legislators condition the impacts of legislator pay. On one hand, when few demands are made, legislators do not need much money to compensate for their time. When legislative demands are low, legislators may not have to sacrifice much time from their regular jobs to serve in the legislature. On the other hand, fulltime legislators must be paid enough to allow them to support themselves and their families without income from outside occupations. Thus, at the extremes, the relationship between time demands and salary needs is simple. But in the middle range, where legislatures meet for several months each year, the situation becomes more complicated. In these states, the point at which legislative salary suffices to compensate for lost income is subtle, clouding these characteristics' implications for careerism (Maddox 2004) .
Time demands also have a second implication for legislators. The limited legislative socialization literature (Bell and Price 1975) suggests that the more days each year that a legislature meets, the better legislators understand the intricacies of the legislative process. Thus, beyond any implications for careerism, longer sessions give members a better chance to master arcane rules and procedures.
The level of staff resources in a legislature has several straightforward implications for legislators. First, a greater number of staff members leads to better-informed legislators, allowing members to have greater influence in the policymaking process. Second, with more impact on policymaking, legislative job satisfaction likely increases with staff resources (Francis 1985) . Finally, a larger staff base likely improves re-election prospects by enhancing legislators' ability to provide constituent services. Greater job satisfaction and enhanced re-election prospects clearly promote careerism. But the contribution that staff makes to a legislator's ability to affect policymaking remains independent of careerism.
Thus, this examination of the theoretical implications of the three components of professionalism for legislators shows that only some of them are clearly linked to careerism. Others imply that professionalism will increase legislators' policymaking capacities without necessarily requiring longer tenures. Consequently, even at the level of the individual legislator, the concept of professionalism is not equal to the concept of careerism.
The institutional implications of legislative professionalism are gener-ally clear-cut and well understood. First, higher salaries allow legislators to devote more time and energy to lawmaking by freeing them from the distraction of another occupation, which can lead to longer-serving, and therefore more informed and effective, legislators (Squire 1988a) . Second, higher salaries attract better-qualified legislators, in terms of academic credentials, occupational status, and the like, a prominent notion in European legislative studies (Eliassen and Pedersen 1978; King 1981; Saalfeld 1997) but overlooked in American legislative studies. Third, meeting for more days each year provides legislators with more time to develop legislative proposals and more time to deliberate on them, thereby improving legislative output (Rosenthal 1996, 171) . Fourth, increased staff resources make the legislature a more equal partner with the executive branch in policymaking (Rosenthal 1996, 171-2) . Thus, the components of the traditional legislative professionalism measures have somewhat different implications for legislators than for the institutions in which they serve. In combination, however, these components constitute a concept not captured by each of them individually. Conceptually, professional legislators are not just longer serving, they are also better equipped as policymakers for reasons beyond their longevity. Additionally, professional legislatures are stronger competitors in the policymaking process for more reasons than just their being composed of veteran members.
Finally, it is important to note that the potential impact of term limits on legislative professionalism is apt to be limited. Term limits do not alter the number of days a legislature meets, the salary its members earn, or the staff that is provided. Instead, term limits potentially truncate the legislative career, reducing the benefits gained from experience. Only in a handful of the 15 states with term limits-arguably California, Michigan, and Ohio-do they have any significant implications for professionalism because it is only in those few state legislatures that limits force the bulk of members to leave earlier than they might have otherwise (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004; Moncrief, Thompson, Haddon, and Hoyer 1992) . Even in these few states, only the lower chamber is significantly impacted regarding member experience because with term limits the upper chamber typically becomes populated with former members of the lower chamber (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004, 369-70) . Notably, even before the imposition of term limits, most members of the professional California Assembly opted to serve for only a few terms (Squire 1988a (Squire , 1988b (Squire , 1992b . All of these observations suggest that a professional legislature need not necessarily be a career legislature.
the mechanics of measuring legislative professionalism
My professionalism index, like virtually all other measures of this characteristic, includes indicators of pay, session length, and staff resources, and measuring each of these components presents challenges.
Measuring Legislator Salary and Benefits.
Two significant aspects of member remuneration must be considered when developing an indicator: salary from legislative service and retirement or health care benefits. Only the former has ever been included in legislative professionalism measures, including my own. But as I argue below, employment benefits may affect a legislator's re-election decision.
A valid measure of state legislative salaries presents at least two challenges. First, although Congress and most state legislatures pay their members an annual salary, legislators in nine states only receive per diems or weekly salaries while the legislature is in session. Fortunately, it is reasonably straightforward to calculate annual remuneration for these nine states, at least when the session length can be determined accurately.
Second, a state legislator's total income is difficult to gauge accurately because just over half of the states provide their legislators with unvouchered (or functionally unvouchered) expense reimbursements. We can assume that vouchered expense reimbursements compensate legislators only for real expenses they incur in serving and, therefore, should not be counted as income. In contrast, unvouchered expense reimbursements often become vehicles for boosting legislators' salaries without drawing public attention. While it is relatively easy to calculate how much money a state's legislators receive in unvouchered expenses, short of accessing legislators' tax returns, it is impossible to distinguish between compensation for real expenses and supplementary income.
Thus, as other such measures have done, my professionalism index uses the base legislative salary figure in a state, which provides a good approximation of overall compensation (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000, 696; Squire 1988a, 69) . Would including unvouchered expenses change the measure in any appreciable way? In a handful of states, the salary figure would change considerably if unvouchered expenses were included. The most notable case is Alabama, where in 2005, for example, the $10 per diem paled in comparison to the unvouchered expense payments of $2,280 per month, plus an additional $50 per day for three days during each week that the legislature met.
But even if adding unvouchered expense reimbursements changed salary figures noticeably in a few states, the impact on the overall legislative professionalism measure is minor, especially because salary represents one of three equally weighted components. For example, my professionalism measure for 2003 using the simple base salary measure correlates at .99 with the same year's measure substituting a salary figure that includes even the generous unvouchered expense reimbursements, as calculated by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).
Finally, it is worth considering whether the availability and generosity of pensions and healthcare coverage should be included in the legislative income calculation. For example, even with its high salary, the appeal of legislative service in California may have been reduced since voters abolished the legislative pension plan in 1990. On the flip side, Texas legislators are paid an annual salary of only $7,200, but they may find their body's generous pension plan-which is tied to state judicial salaries and provides an annual pension of $34,500 after 12 years of service-worthy of continuing in office. Thus, employment benefits may need to be incorporated in future legislative professionalism measures.
Measuring the Time Demands of Legislative Service
The number of days, state legislatures meet is reported in one of two ways: calendar days and legislative days. Calendar days generally represent the number of days between the opening and closing of the legislative session, including days when the legislature does not actually meet. Legislative days signify the number of days the legislature actually meets. In my view, the relevant consideration for legislative professionalism is how many days a legislator must be in the state capitol to conduct legislative business, and thus, be unavailable for other business and personal activities. Therefore, I use the number of legislative days in computing my professionalism measure. This method requires a conversion for those states that report only calendar days. I use a simple and rough calculation, deflating the number of calendar days by five-sevenths to approximate the number of legislative days in a state for a given year. This process assumes that a legislature meets five days per week while in session and may overestimate the number of days the legislature actually met. My measure does not take into account the time demands made on legislators by special sessions, but this likely does not damage its validity or reliability. Special sessions intrude on a member's time significantly only if they are used routinely as a device to evade session limits. In such a case, they could add substantially to the number of days a legislature actually meets each year. But special sessions are rarely, if at all, used in this fashion. Indeed, in 18 states, the legislature does not even possess the power to call a special session. The vast majority of state legislative special sessions are limited in scope, with agendas devoted to only a few issues, making them substantively different from regular sessions.
In practice, adding the number of days in special session makes virtually no difference to my legislative professionalism measure. For example, for 2003 my index correlates at .99 with the same measure with special session days added. Indeed, the NCSL surveyed legislators in 2003 ask, among other things, how much time they devoted to their legislative service, broadly construed (Kurtz et al. 2006) . Even though such self-reports are prone to exaggeration and encompass any activity related to legislative service, the responses to that survey question aggregated by state legislature correlate with my measure of time demands for that year at .59.
Measuring Legislative Staff Resources
To measure a legislator's staff resources, I use legislative staff figures gathered by the NCSL (2004). They report three sets of numbers: permanent staff, session-only staff, and total staff during the session. I use the last of these because I am interested in how much assistance legislators receive during a session. Thus, the NCSL's staffing numbers (measured in 1979, 1988, 1996, and 2003) tap directly into the concept I want to measure. Unfortunately, valid and reliable data on state legislative staff are difficult to find for years in which the NCSL did not conduct its surveys. Therefore, some researchers have opted to use annual budget figures for a state legislature as a surrogate for staff resources (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Moncrief 1988 ). However, legislative expenditures are potentially confounded by the inclusion of legislator salaries, the cost of building maintenance, and other housekeeping items unrelated to staffing, depending on what a state legislature includes in its budget. But scholars can take comfort from the fact that legislative expen-ditures and staffing levels are highly correlated (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000, 696) and that legislative professionalism measures incorporating either legislative expenditures or staffing numbers produce remarkably consistent state rankings (Berkman 2001, 675; Maestas 2003, 448; Mooney 1994) .
Evaluating the Squire Legislative Professionalism Index
Using these data and coding rules, I calculated professionalism scores for each state legislature for 1979, 1986, 1996, and 2003 , as shown in Table 2 . To compute these values, I divided the score for each state legislature on each of the three dimensions by the parallel score for Congress (averaged for both chambers) for the same years. I added the scores for the three components and divided by three. Thus, each of the three components is equally weighted. This calculation yields a score for each state that can be interpreted as the percentage of professionalism that its legislature had compared to Congress that year. An examination of the scores in Table 2 provides some insight into the index's reliability and validity.
Reliability
A cross-year comparison of the scores in Table 2 for each state suggests that the measure is reliable. The scores do not bounce around much from year to year, which is what we should expect, given that during this time period state legislatures did not undergo radical changes in their professionalism. Furthermore, almost no state moves up or down much in rank from year to year. Overall, these figures indicate a highly reliable measure.
Validity
The validity of the measure can be assessed in two ways. First consider its face validity. The scores in Table 2 parallel nicely with both qualitative assessments of state legislative professionalism (Hamm and Moncrief 2004, 158; Rosenthal 1993, 116-7; Kurtz 1992, 2) and other quantitative measures (Mooney 1994) . Second, and perhaps more importantly, the measure has predictive validity. That is, it has performed as expected in many studies of state politics and policies, given hypotheses of the causes and effects of legislative professionalism. For example, several studies have found a state's population to have a strong positive relationship with state legislative professionalism as measured by this index (King 2000; Mooney 1995; Squire 2005; Squire and Hamm 2005) . Membership turnover has shown to decline as professionalism increases (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004) . Legislators in more professional legislatures have more contact with their constituents (Squire 1993) and are more attentive Professionalism-1979 Professionalism- , 1986 Professionalism- , 1996 Professionalism- , and 2003 Professionalism- 1979 Professionalism- 1979 Professionalism- 1986 Professionalism- 1986 Professionalism- 1996 Professionalism- 1996 : 1979 : , 1988 : , 1996 : ," dated May 6, 2004 . Congressional data are taken from Dwyer 2004 , Congressional Quarterly 1993 , and Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2000 to constituent concerns (Maestas 2003) than are their counterparts in less professional legislatures. Legislative efficiency-the percentage of bills passed and the number of bills enacted per legislative day-is positively related to professionalism (Squire 1998) . The inclination to reform government personnel practices increases with legislative professionalism (Kellough and Selden 2003) , as does the willingness to adopt increasingly complex and technical policies (Ka and Teske 2002) . Per capita government spending also increases with the level of legislative professionalism (Owings and Borck 2000) . Each of these hypotheses of the causes and effects of professionalism was supported using my measure, demonstrating its predictive validity.
professionalism as a moving target
One potential problem with my measure of legislative professionalism is that the congressional baseline continually moves. In other words, as Congress changes over time, the standard by which I measure state legislative professionalism changes. It is as if the state legislatures are in a race to become like Congress, but Congress keeps moving the finish line. Consider the effect of this phenomenon on New Hampshire's relative standing on my index over time. New Hampshire shows this moving standard effect well because its absolute value on the indicators that compose my measure barely change at all. The state constitution set legislative pay at $200 per biennium in 1889, and it has not changed since then. The legislature meets for essentially the same number of days per year as a century ago and still employs only a small staff. In effect, New Hampshire's legislature could serve as an alternative baseline for professionalism because of its lack of change. But how has the New Hampshire legislature's professionalism standing compared to Congress changed over time? Evidence presented elsewhere shows that from 1935 to 1960, New Hampshire scored higher than it has in more recent decades (Squire 2005; Squire 2006 ). As shown in Table 2 , New Hampshire places last in every time period from 1979 to 2003, and more importantly, its scores drop with each succeeding period, albeit by a small amount. Thus, New Hampshire's scores document that the standard by which a professional legislature is measured in my index has become more stringent over time. Simply by not changing its legislature, New Hampshire has fallen further and further behind the professionalism standard set by Congress.
As a result, is it fair to keep moving the standard? For example, a legislature could increase staffing from one point in time to the next but appear to lose ground because Congress improved its staffing even more. Because Congress serves as the baseline, it if changes its session length, staffing, and pay over a given period, then the scores from my index could be inappropriate for use in analyses involving professionalism over that time period. One way to explore the extent of this potential problem is to anchor the professionalism standard set by Congress and recalculate my measure. I did this by calculating the grand mean for Congress on each of the three professionalism indicators using data from the late 1970s and the early 2000s, converting the earlier salary figures to 2003 dollars to control for inflation. Then, I recalculated the state legislative professionalism scores for 1979 and 2003 using these congressional grand means. The results, presented in Table  3 , reveal an important substantive finding. The mean and median scores indicate that, measured against the anchored congressional score, state legislatures made modest progress in their professionalism between 1979 and 2003. This finding contradicts the storyline suggested by the data in Table 2 that use the single-year congressional baseline, which shows a slight decline in professionalism over that time period. However, the differences between the two grand mean professionalism scores and their counterparts reported in Table 2 are small. The correlations among the professionalism scores in Tables 2 and 3 are presented in Table 4 . The two grand mean scores correlate at .99 with the regular professionalism scores using the single-year baseline for their respective years. Indeed, all of these professionalism scores are highly correlated with each other, with the expected pattern that the correlations are somewhat smaller for those scores that are further apart. These correlations provide additional confirmation of my professionalism index's reliability.
Why do the grand mean legislative professionalism scores change so little 1979 , 1988 , 1996 ," dated May 6, 2004 . Congressional data are taken from Dwyer 2004, Congressional from their regular one-year baseline score counterparts? The answer is that on two of the three dimensions of professionalism, Congress did not change much between 1999 and 2003, and the congressional baseline barely changed. This lack of change is no surprise. Staffing levels have changed little in Congress in recent decades. If anything, congressional staff has been reduced slightly since 1995 (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2000, 132) . And while Congress has both greater ability and greater will to increase its salary than do most state legislatures, the actual salary changes in Note: All scores are statistically distinct from zero at p≤.01, using a two-tailed test.
concluding thoughts
The evidence presented in this article suggests that my state legislative professionalism index is a reliable and valid measure. Moreover, the measure is easy to understand and intuitively appealing. However, I have two cautionary comments about its use in statistical analysis. First, rank ordering of state legislative professionalism, while perhaps of some cursory interest, provides limited analytical use. For example, looking at the scores for 2003 in Table  2 , one would be hard pressed to make the case that there was any significant difference in the policymaking capacities or professionalism generally of the Texas, North Carolina, and Washington state legislatures. After all, a small tweak in the way salary is calculated or days in session are counted could easily re-order their positions in these rankings. Second, scores of the sort presented in Table 4 may be preferred for dynamic analyses. Overall, however, I conclude that my index of state legislative professionalism, first presented 15 years ago, is robust and appropriate for use in a wide variety of studies.
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